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This report deals with a term project in Washington, D.C. that
was undertaken to gather information for use in further developing the
Systems Acquisition Management (SAM) Curriculum at the Naval Post-
graduate School. This was to be accomplished by observation of actual
project office operations.
The objective of the eighteen month Systems Acquisition Management
Curriculum (816) , which leads to a Master of Science Degree in Manage-
ment, is "to provide selected officers with an advance education in
the fundamental concepts, methodology, and analytical techniques for
the life cycle management of the planning and acquisition of defense
systems." Curriculum design is specifically oriented to stress the
system life cycle, "real world" environment, and integration of all of
the individual techniques of decision making and problem solving.
This emphasis, of directly relating the curriculum to meet the
needs of the officers once assigned to projects, suggested a requirement
for both observing project office operations and soliciting ideas and
recommendations from project managers themselves.
Observing project operations through discussions with people,
attending meetings, etc. would be a means for helping determine the
primary areas of concern, defining problems, finding how projects are
organized to accomplish their objectives, establishing what management
methods and styles are used, and seeing how the project organizations
interact with others. Previous contact with several Project Managers
confirmed that they would assist in any way possible to provide such
information.
An invitation had been extended by the Naval Logistics Management
School (NLMS), Washington, D. C, for me to attend the two week
Weapon System Acquistion Management Baseline Course, commencing
27 September. This would provide an introduction to the current
Washington project environment, and facilitate my meeting managers
from the project and functional organizations.
During the period 27 September through 3 December 1971, I attended the
NLMS Baseline Course and visited numerous project and project-related
functional organizations. In those cases where people were unfamiliar
with the NPS SAM Curriculum, I advised them of the objectives and
outlined the types of courses that were being offered. In addition
to discussing the operations of these organizations, I solicited ideas
concerning their reaction to having officer students being assigned to
project offices for experience tours, and requested any documentation,
i.e. reports, instructions, etc., that could be provided for use in
the SAM courses.
The following sections will summarize my experiences at the NLMS
Baseline Course and visits to project and functional organizations. In
format, each section will contain a background description brief and
comments concerning my experiences with that individual organization.
What I have attempted to accomplish is providing a general overview
of my visits, by identifying which organizations were visited, what the
organization does, brief comments on the organization and staffing,
what I did while in contact with the organization and what types of
documentation would be available (where appropriate) . These summaries
do not cover the specifics of all topics discussed, due to the class-
ification or sensitivity of information.
The final sections contain comments and observations concerning
the general project environment, and provide conclusions and recommen-
dations. Appendix A lists the NLMS Baseline Course attendees and
Appendix B identifies the names of people that were contacted in the
various organizations.
WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT BASELINE COURSE
Background Information:
The Weapon System Acquisition Management Baseline Course was
established at the Navy Logistics Management School, Naval Station,
Washington, D.C. and offered for the first time in February 1971.
Indoctrination of Project Managers, OPNAV Program Sponsors, their
deputies and other selected senior military and civilian personnel
in the latest philosophy, policies and practices relating to project
management is the primary purpose of this course. It is scheduled
four times per year, and is designed to accomodate six to fifteen
students per class. The course length is ten days, and lectures,
seminars and review of cases are employed as methods of instruction.
Instructors are senior military and civilian personnel from the
Navy Department, Department of Defense, General Accounting Office,
Etc. , who have current operating experience in the areas being
covered in the course.
Course Format:
The course is divided roughly into twenty-six different areas. The
areas and major topics are outlined and briefly summarized below:
Navy Project Management Philosophy - current philosophy, policies
and directives being emphasized today.
National Economic Projections - familiarization with current and
expected future economic trends and their effect on project management.
Defense Systems Acquisition Cycle - explanation of the phases of
acquisition, i.e. ACP, DCP, SAR, DSARC, and other life cycle elements.
Relationship & Responsibilities in the Program Sponsorship /
Project Management Process - discussion of the roles and interfaces
between the OPNAV Program Sponsors, Program Coordinators, Appropria-
tion Sponsors and the Project Managers.
User-Producer Dialogue - emphasizes general dialogue and inter-
faces between the Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet, Chief of Naval
Material and activities in the Naval Material Command in the acquisi-
tion process.
OPNAV Program Coordinator Views - presentation by a major
Porgram Coordinator concerning a specific program modus operandus.
Planning & Its Many Elements - discussion of planning requirements,
from the DOD/NAVMAT point of view.
Programming & Budgeting - explanation and discussion of the
Programming and Budgeting Cycle, as it applies to project management.
Five Year Defense Program Review - FYDP , POMs , PDMs, budget
submissions, reprogramming, etc.
Justification of Budget Estimates - requirements, timing,
pricing, obligation vs expenditure, appropriations, etc.
Execution of the Budget Cycle - funds flow and distribution,
account structures, financial data, reporting, organizational
relationships.
Role of the Systems Command Comptroller - presentation by
two comptrollers concerning financial responsibilities of Project
Managers and their interaction with the comptroller organizations.
Life Cycle Costing (LCC)- introduction to policy, procedures
and implementation of LCC concepts.
Testing & Evaluation - brief overview of Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) today and future emphasis.
Data Management - management of project data and reporting
systems.
Satefy - new emphasis on system safety engineering and its
relationship to project management.
Performance Measurement - introduction into the contractor
management control systems required by DOD Instruction 7000.1.
Cost Aspects of Weapon System Acquisition - explanation of current
cost estimating techniques, their reliability and use in actual
practice.
Procurement & Contract Administration - applications relating to
the acquisition of weapons systems.
Development Contracts - general background information and
discussion of operating procedures.
Proposal Evaluation & Source Selection - review of the
requirements in developing a Request for Proposal, then evaluating
and selecting a contractor.
Legal Aspects of Contract Administration - emphasizes the
evaluation and control of constructive changes, change control
techniques, claims, etc.
Field Contract Administration - mission and scope of field
contract administration responsibilities and their impact on project
management.
Configuration Management - discussion of concepts and techniques,
and the relationship to project acquisition planning.
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) - discussion of life cycle
support, relating ILS to the other management disciplines.
Task Planning & Evaluation Techniques - actual experiences in
establishing successful management review and control techniques in
an actual project.
Organization in Support of Project Managers - review of recent
studies concerning the top-level Navy Department organization and
its relationship to Project Managers.
Personnel Staffing - current trends in civilian and military
manpower management
.
The General Accounting Office - defines the role of GAO in the
acquisition process and the Navy/GAO relationships.
Congressional Liaison - defines the role of witnesses appearing
before Congressional Committees, methods of preparation for and
presentation during hearings, and previous experiences by Navy Project
Managers in testifying.
Case Studies - illustrative cases presented by individual Project
Managers.
Acquisition of a Major Weapon System - every-day operations,
problem solving and decision making.
Project Organization - organizing and staffing a major project
which is designated both a CNM and Systems Command Project.
Theory vs. Reality - question and answer period chaired by a
Project Manager.
DSARC Realities - preparation for and presentation to the
Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council.
Review Periods - allocated for review and discussion of topics
previously presented.
Seminar & Concluding Exercises - address by a guest speaker and
presentation of certificates to course graduates.
Method of Presentation:
During the two-week period, over forty speakers participated. A
two-volume course notebook was provided to each student, which con-
tained a complete course outline, handout material and references for
each topic presented. In this manner the students were able to know
what was being presented and read through the background reference
material in advance. This served to help keep the wide range of
topics being discussed in their proper perspective, and precipitated
much more meaningful student discussion with the speakers.
The oral review periods during the course and a written critique,
submitted just prior to course completion, provided each student with
the opportunity to express his thoughts about the content of the
course itself and the effectiveness of the individual speakers.
From this information the NLMS staff updates or changes the material
provided during future courses and speakers can reevaluate their
presentations in light of student comments. Comments are then reviewed
by NAVMAT headquarters management personnel to assure that students are
receiving the correct material, presented in a proper fashion.
Summary
:
Since the Navy Logistics Management School has provided the Naval
Postgraduate School with complete course documentation, this section will
summarize major thoughts, ideas and events covered by the speakers them-
selves, either individually or collectively.
The Laird/Packard Philosophy, stated in a formal sense, stresses
"participatory decision-making," "defined decentralization," "and
delegation under guidance." This philosophy, expressed through a people
oriented management style, is characterized by a scaling down of resources
without hindering our ability to meet constantly changing threats to
national security.
Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard has stated that innovative
urgency is required at all echelons and that the OSD will assume a greater
policy making vice operational role. He views the individual services
and agencies assuming more of the implementation role and the present OSD
organization reducing in size.
Several thoughts that have been emphasized by Mr. Packard, in ref-
erence to the management area, include: (1) management in the Services
will be improved only to the extent that capable people are designated
to manage the programs; (2) program managers must be given adequate
authority to make decisions on major questions relating to their programs;
(3) program managers must be given more recognition toward career advance-
ment; (4) program managers must be assigned to a given program long enough
to be effective; and (5) the layering of authority between the program
manager and the Service Secretary must be minimized by changing the
present management techniques. More concisely stated "put more capable
people into program management, give them the responsibility and authority
and keep them there long enough to get the job done right." /!
The requiremnt for URGENCY has been restated and reemphasized on
many occasions. For example, Director of Defense Research and Engineering
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., in a speech early in 1971, assessed the relative
positions of technology between the United States and the Solviet Union.
At that time, we held the lead; the USSR was gaining at a rate of 3 to 4
months per year; they would either equal or exceed our capability in the
1975-1980 time frame; and without change in our present way of doing
business we may not be able to catch up. Then in a speech during the
fall of 1971, he suggested that the Soviets will surpass us in technical
superiority.
The complexity of the weapons system acquisition process in recog-
nized by DDR&E, due to changes in threat, technology and national pro-
orities, as well as inflation, highly interdependent weapons systems
components and the inherent risks in research and development. They
categorize the major factors contributing to cost, schedule and perfor-
mance problems as (1) failure to get a good program to start with due
to: inadequate definition of requirements, insufficient hardware demon-
stration, unreliability of cost estimating, funding insufficiency, pre-
mature commitment to system development, optomistic/concurrent schedules,
/l DEPSECDEF Memo of 5/28/70, Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System
Acquisition
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and insufficient identification and reduction of risk, or: (2) failure
to manage the program properly after it starts because of: overcentrali-
zation of military departments and OSD, funding inefficiency and variations,
excessive technical documentation, too many and too detailed management
systems, reliance on management systems vice people, lack of sufficient
high quality managers, inflexibility of contracting methods, and pre-
mature commitments considering the risks involved.
OSD visualizes the DOD actions necessary to relieve problems at
program start to include: DCPs and Program Memoranda, DSARCs, formal
risk analyses using outside sources of evaluation, management reviews,
more thorough concept formulation, budgeting to "best estimate," cost
realism, prototyping as a means of resolving uncertainty, emphasis on
simplicity and reduction of performance requirements, reduction of
concurrency, and not allowing overdesign.
In order to relieve problems after program start, DOD actions in-
clude: milestone concept, establishment of DCP thresholds, clarification
of OSD and service roles, reduction in overhead (excess number of reviews
and data requirements, decision layering, etc.)> flexible contracting,
upgrading of program managers, control of engineering changes, hold-
ing to a funding profile, and SARs.
Prototyping is viewed by Dr. Foster as a means of obtaining more
options in decision making. He feels that the way we are going today
we will lose our capability for creativity in industry, therefore we
must develop independent solutions to solve operational problems,
instead of the military attempting to define the problem, developing
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detailed specifications, then getting industry to bid on building the
systems.
The previous paragraphs outline the major problems and solutions as
seen by OSD. I would now like to discuss several aspects of these
problems from personal observation, that are not addressed in the recom-
mended solutions.
I have found no basic disagreement with the Laird/Packard philosophy
or with the emphasis on urgency by both Mr. Packard and Dr. Foster.
However, layering, concurrency and resolving uncertainty through proto-
typing are among those areas that merit further discussion.
Layering in decision making has been recognized as a traditional
problem in the military services. The current policy of identifying
Project Managers by name and delineating their authority and responsibil-
ities in the Project Charters has given a degree of visibility to these
billets. This has enabled higher authority, i.e. officials of the Ex-
ecutive and Congressional Branches, OSD, OSN, OPNAV, NAVMAT, etc. to
communicate directly with a PM concerning his project, however, the
reverse chain of cummunications, even in answering inquiries from these
sources, is quite different. The following considerations may serve to
illustrate this problem: WHO (person or organization)
:
(1) is asking the question, requesting a decision, or impacted
by a decision?
(2) has control of the funds, or seniority in the situation?
(3) needs (or wants) to be kept advised, or consulted?
(4) are those that support (or oppose) you in this situation?
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WHAT.
(1) is the question, decision to be made, or the impact of a
decision on other persons or organizations?
(2) are the political, economic or social considerations, or
the budgetary, operational or technical implications?
WHEN (in reference to time)
:
(1) should or can a decision be made, or decision rendered?
(2) or how in the past has a similar situation been addressed?
HOW (in reference to method of communication)
:
(1) should or can a decision be expressed or inquiry answered?
The amount of layering in the decision process can be affected by
the above considerations, and the answer to this problem has not been
found to date, even though all echelons of management agree that the
problem does exist. Successful PMs have been able to partially reconcile
the problem through their own individual resourcefulness in dealing with
situations as they occur, but at best the situation is still unsatisfactory,
Concurrency and resolving uncertainty through prototyping can be
discussed together. The problem arises when the decision is made to
commence production of a system prior to completion of engineering de-
velopment or prior to adequate test and evaluation of the system. In the
past, some instances have occurred where it was felt that the need for a
system was so urgent that it had to be made available to the operating
forces at the earliest possible date. Decisions were made to proceed
with production, even though all of the design and engineering problems
had not been solved. Over optimism as to the ability to resolve these
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problems resulted in either introducing a system to the forces that did
not have the intended capability, or continued delay and resultant cost
growth beyond the original intentions. The results of these past errors
have been well publicized by our critics.
We can see a shift toward prototyping in NAVSHIPS through the new
Patrol Frigate (PF) Program, in which an industry/Navy team effort will
go into the detailed design and engineering effort, and a lead ship will
be built. At a later point in time, separate contracts are to be awarded
for construction of groups of these ships. This is a quite different
approach than that used for the DD 963 Program, where one contractor is
developing, engineering and producing a whole program's worth of
ships.
Will this concept work for weapons systems under development that
will eventually be allocated to and installed aboard these same ships
and others now in the active fleet? If a given weapons system has broad
or universal application, which is intended to meet a threat which exists
today, do we have time for prototyping? Or, should be build and test
multiple units simultaneously?
The answers to these questions will not be resolved through flexible
interpretation of the concurrency and prototyping policy. If the
urgency of a program is such that the Project Manger has universal support,
including the allocation of budget dollars, the problem will tend to
disappear. If the program is inadequately funded, regardless of
urgency, the problem will still exist. How the Project (or Program)
Managers trade-off the risks involved in building and delivering
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multiple units with the delays involved in prototyping is still
undetermined.
The lack of budget dollars to support program objectives was expressed
as a major problem both during the course and later by Project Managers.
One PM pointed out in his presentation that "time is money." Compressing
a schedule to get earlier delivery will cost more and stretching out
delivery over a longer time frame will also cost more. This budgetary
dilemma becomes progressively more vivid when facts are presented, such
as "steel prices alone will cause us to exceed our budget predictions by
$250 million in fiscal year 1973" and "people costs are now 50% of the
total budget and are estimated to go to at least 64% within two years,
and possibly to 68%."
Cutting down on expenses through personnel reductions-in-force has
become a way of life. Personnel losses at the headquarters level are
even more acute for Navy than the other services. This is caused by
the disproportionate percentage of lower than command level echelons in
the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area. With adequate personnel not
being available to properly staff the existing project offices now,
some officials feel that the only solution will be vertical cuts, which
will mean elimination of some of the projects.
Because of the downtrend in availability of budget dollars, cost
estimating has become on the the most critical problem areas in acquisi-
tion management, and is considered by some to he the most difficult to
handle. Although dollar cost is a common denominator, regardless of the
size or scope of the program, type of contract, priority of need, etc.,
it presents unique problems when projected into the economic uncertainties
of future time periods.
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Accurate cost estimates are required for three primary purposes
during the acquisition process: first, in deciding whether or not
to initiate a program; second, in order to authorize and allocate
budget dollars; and third, in contract pricing. Credibility in cost
estimating has been historically low, because of our inability to de-
termine the final configuration of the system during the early stages
of development and properly predict the effects of economic and tech-
nological change that will occur in time.
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ANTI-AIR WARFARE (AAW) SHIP ACQUISITION PROJECT
Background Information:
The Anti-Warfare (AAW) Ship Acquisition Project (PMS 378) was
established by the Naval Ship Systems Command on 1 February 1967 and
formally chartered 1 November 1967. The organization evolved from
Code 400G, established in August 1962 as the Surface Missile Systems
(SMS) Coordinator, and redesignated Code 521 AAW Ship Branch in April
1966.
Management control responsibilities for both building and moderni-
zation extend to eight basic types of AAW ships: cruisers of the CLG,
CG and CGN classes, destroyers of the DDG, DLG, and DLGN classes, LFS
and AVM. These ships contain highly sophisticated missile, radar,
communications and weapon-direction equipments.
The Project Manager, due to the need for a continuing liaision with
the Naval Ordnance Systems Command for SMS systems, is also a member
of the Surface Missile Systems (SMS) Project staff.
PMS 378 uses a matrix organization. One ordinate of the matrix is
oriented to ship type, and presently consists of Assistant Project Managers
(and staffs) for DLGN 36 Class, DLG Modernizations, and DLGN 38 Class.
The other ordinate is composed of groups that are concerned with systems,
subsystems, and components which go into the ships. These include a
Ship System Management Division, Integrated Logistics Support Division
and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) /Government Furnished Information
(GFI) Manager. The Plans, Programs and Financial Management Division
provides additional staff support.
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The project staff consists of seven military officers and approxi-
mately fifty eight civilian personnel. There is a military Project Mana-
ger (CAPT/1400) , civilian Deputy Project Manager (GS 15) and APM staffs
that total four military and twenty civilians. The Ships Systems Manage-
ment, ILS and GFE/GFI Divisions total two military and twenty one civil-
ians, and the Plans, Programs and Financial Management Divisions has
six civilians.
Visit Summary:
My interest in observing PMS 378 operations carries over from my
last two tours of duty (Philadelphia Naval Shipyard - one of two ship-
yards participating in the AAW Modernization Programs; USS STERETT (DLG 31)
DLG 26 Class new construction program) . Both of these tours contributed
to a continuing relationship with this project organization.
Since this experience was oriented to a Naval shipyard/ship rela-
tionship with the project office, I was primarily interested in finding
information concerning the contractor/SUPSHIP side of project operations.
The Project Manager and Deputy were greatly interested in the NPS SAM
Curriculum and invited me to spend as much time as I desired in visiting
their project office.
A Quarterly Production Progress Conference was held at Newport News,
Virginia on 20 and 21 October for the DLGN36 and DLGN38. The PMS 378
staff presented the government portion of the conference and Newport
News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company conducted the contractor portion.
The agenda was prepared well in advance, so the project office, contractor
and SUPSHIP attendees were prepared to address the items of mutual interest
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and concern. Agenda items included: Design Progress and Problems, Ma-
terial, Contractor Modification Status, Construction Progress, PERT,
Master Erection Schedule, Provisioning Technical Documentation, Technical
Manuals and Combat Systems Test Program. I attended the conference,
received a copy of the Conference Report, and toured the DLGN 36 and 37
construction sites with the conference attendees.
During the course of my visit I met with the DLGN Project Officer
and his deputy. A summary of the meeting is covered in the section of
this report entitled Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair,
Newport News.
Since the APM and contract staff for the DLGN 38 were applying full
time efforts to the negotiation of a new contract with Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, I was unable to discuss this part of
project operations with the staff during the course of my visit. Infor-
mation concerning the contract will be available after the negotiations
have been completed.
The PMS 378 staff provided a great deal of documentation pertaining
to project management within the Naval Ship Systems Command, and assisted
in obtaining information from other codes. This information will be
summarized separately and turned over to the SAM Library.
19
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE (ASW) SHIP ACQUISITION PROJECT
Background Information:
The Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Ship Acquisition Project (PMS 380)
was established by the Naval Ship Systems Command on 1 February 1967.
The programs allocated to this office included Destroyers (DDs) , Ocean
Escorts (Es) and Guided Missile Ocean Escorts (DEGs) , all of which are
designed to operate offensively against submarines and to screen support
forces and convoys, in addition to contingent tasks.
One of the programs managed by PMS 380 is the DD 931/945 Class ASW
Modernization Program.
Visit Summary:
My interest in visiting this office resulted from working with the
PMS 380 staff in the past. The ASW Modernization Program started with
eight DD-931/945 Class ships being programmed for overhaul and moderni-
zation at the Charleston and Boston Naval Shipyards. Long lead time
material was ordered, however the whole program had to be deferred due to
higher priority commitments in Southeast Asia.
Later the decision was made to conduct the modernizations at Bath,
Maine in a private shipyard. Even though more long lead time material
had been ordered, high costs caused the program to again be deferred.
Finally the decision was made to have the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard
handle the program, and again more material was ordered.
In early 1969, due to the workload at the Philadelphia Naval
Shipyard being too heavy to complete the ships within the programmed
time frame, the decision was made to reallocate two ships to Boston
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Naval Shipyard, two to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, let three remain at
Philadelphia and drop one completely (due to high costs) . While the
start/stop decisions were being made, the individual ships originally
shceduled for the program were continuously changed as time went on.
This series of events is indicative of several aspects of uncertainty
in project management. These are scheduling uncertainties, caused by
redefinition of priorities and funding constraints, and secondly the
uncertainty of not knowing if the program will be completed at all, due
to the same factors. Project Managers and their staffs must make plans
and preparations to start work within given time frames, according to
predetermined schedules. Then if changes occur, such as those described
above which were for the most part entirely beyond the control of the
project staff, they must then assume the responsibility for reconstructing
plans to coincide with the new constraints. This indeed results in a
trememdous replanning and coordination burden for the Project Manager and
his staff.
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AUXILIARY AND AMPHIBIOUS SHIP ACQUISITION PROJECT
Background Information:
The Auxiliary and Amphibious Ship Acquisition Project (PMS 383) is
being chartered by the Naval Ship Systems Command. _/l Originally
auxiliary ships were managed by the Auxiliary Ship Acquisition Project
(PMS 383) and amphibious ships and boats were under the cognizance of
the Landing Ships, Boats and Amphibious Ship Acquisition Project (PMS 384).
On 30 August 1971, PMS 384 ship acquisition responsibilities were trans-
ferred to PMS 383 and boat responsibilities were transferred to the Com-
bat Craft Acquisition Project (PMS 300). At this point PMS 384 was
disestablished.
This project is considered a conglomerate, in that a widely diver-
sified number of different types of ships come under the cognizance of
one SHAPM. The types of ships managed by PMS 383 include: AE, AFS, AO
AOE, AOR, AD, AS, AR, AS (FBM) , T-AK(FBM) , LCC , LKA, FDL, AH, ARC, LPD,
LSD, and BDL.
The project staff consists of six military officers and approximately
forty eight civilians. There is a military Project Manager (CAPT/1400)
,
civilian deputy (GS-15) and four Assistant Project Managers (Tenders;
Amphibious, Research and Special Mission Ships, UNREP Wet Cargo; UNREP
Dry Cargo)
.
Two functional divisions support the AMP staffs (Ship
System Management & Support Division; Plans and Programs Division)
.




PMS 383 manages the acquisition of a wider range of ship types than
any other SHAPM in NAVSHIPS. The management orientation of this pro-
ject is quite different from many of the others, in that almost all of
the ships are in the production phase, or have heen delivered and are
in the warranty period. This requires the project staff to deal not
only with contractor, SUPSHIP and headquarters personnel, but the individ-
ual ships commissioning crews. Problems that were known but not corrected
during production, as well as a whole host of new problems will surface
rapidly during this period of time.
The project workload is summarized as follows:
As of 1 September 1971, there were 33 ships in the production
and post production stages (20 had been delivered, 3 were scheduled
for delivery during the remainder of 1971 and 10 were scheduled
for delivery in 1972). Of the 13 undelivered ships, 6 LSTs
were under construction at National Steel, San Diego, California,
2 LSDs and 2 AORs at General Dynamics, Quincy, Massachusetts,
and 3 AEs at Ingalls, Pascagoula, Mississippi.
During the 10-month period from September 1971 through June
1972, 35 separate ships trials have been scheduled (Builders,
Acceptance, and Final Contract Trials). They range in number
from 2 to 5 per month. Each of the individual trials require
extensive review and analysis effort by the project staff, and
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many require project personnel on site during the actual trials.
Additionally, an AOR and 2 ASs have been authorized in the
Fiscal Year 1972 Shipbuilding Program. At this point in time
the contracts had not yet been issued.
The management staff is confronted with many problems that arise
from a workload of this magnitude and diversity, especially considering
that the present organization has been in existence less than six months,
Most projects work with one contractor and SUPSHIP organization, or at
most a few, whereas PMS 383 deals with six contractor and SUPSHIPS
organizations and one Naval Shipyard, as shown below:






INGALLS PASC. , MISS. AE 4
NAT. STEEL SAN DIEGO, CA. AFS 1
LST 11
GEN DYNAMICS QUINCY, MASS. AOR 4
AS 2
LSD 4
NNSDD CO. NEW. NEWS, VA. LCC 1
LOCKHEED SEATTLE, WASH. LPD 3
PHILA NSY PHILA, PA. LCC 1
Discussions with the project staff highlighted specific problem areas
that can be addressed by the NPS SAM Curriculum. These include Data Manage-




The basic unit being managed is the individual ship. Data inputs
covering the ships are being made from the construction site (contractor
and SUPSHIP ) , the ship itself after delivery, TYCOM staffs, OPNAV, other
project and functional codes within NAVSHIPS and other Systems Commands,
etc. For example, during Acceptance and Final Contract Trials hundreds
of discrepancies are recorded for each ship, and each Trial Item must be
monitored by the project staff. The receipt, processing, evaluation
and reporting of this data is accomplished by individual people and not
-
through use of a computer-based system. The volume of work in this area
challenges the expertise of all engaged in this effort.
Configuration Management
Time becomes an important factor in configuration control, In
addition to the problems created by ships of the same class being con-
structed by more than one shipbuilder. Ships being managed by PMS 383
date back to the FY 1965 Shipbuilding Program. Although mission assign-
ment for the ships remains relatively constant, from time of authorization
until final completion, changes in crew size, habitability and safety
requirements, equipments, etc., create many configuration control prob-
lems. For example, policy changes such as crews being authorized to
carry civilian clothing aboard ship or a new enlisted uniform will cause
additional locker requirements. Berthing compartments may have to be
rearranged or even completely redesigned to meet these new standards.
How to program changes such as these, considering both funding and
space constraints, becomes more than a minor problem.
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Another type of configuration control problem was discussed. Ideally,
all ships of a class should have identical equipments. Shipbuilders in
different parts of the country use different subcontractors and vendors.
Since ships are built to specifications and not to specific equipment
manufacturer's components, there is a definite lack of standardization
between shipbuilders. There is even a 1 ?ck of standardization among
ships produced by the same builder over a period of time, due to changes
in contractors providing the government furnished equipment (GFE) . This
situation creates many problems for the Project Manager's staff, and they
carry over to the fleet afterwards. For example, 17 of the 20 ship LST
program were allocated to National Steel in San Diego, and 3, including
the lead ship of the class, to the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. At one
point in time the stern winch assembly on a PNSY built LST had a major
casualty, and it was located on the West coast. The first solution pro-
posed was to install a whole new winch assembly, which could easily be
provided by National Steel. However, since the winches were made by
different manufacturers, not only the individual components were unlike,
but the foundations to mount the equipment were completely different.
Individual components were cannabalized from a PNSY LST under construction
to solve the immediate problem. However, several days were lost in its
resolve, due to these differences in configuration between the ships.
Management of Cost and Feasibility Studies
Over the past two years discussions have continued between NAVSHIPS
and OPNAV concerning additional AORs, beyond those included in the FY 66
Program. During this time changes to the original baseline have been
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proposed and counter proposed. Resultant evaluations to determine the
cost/price impact of each proposed characteristic change had to be made.
With characteristic uncertainty and insufficient time to develop accurate
cost estimates, the problem of how to accurately forcast end cost becomes
acute.
PMS 383 has provided a copy of the AOR-7 Ship Acquisition Plan
and an AOR-7 Program Chronology, which contains copies of key correspon-
dence to this acquisition program. From this information, project planning,
progress to date, and individual problem areas can be studied further by
NPS SAM students. The Project Manager and his leading staff members fully
support the experience tour concept for SAM students, and have extended
the invitation for students to be assigned to PMS 383 for their experience
tours, should this concept be approved.
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DESTROYER (DP-963/DDG) SHIP ACQUISITION PROJECT
Background Information:
The Destroyer (DD-963/DDG) Ship Acquisition Project was formally
chartered by the Naval Ship Systems Command on 1 August 1969, and the
Project Manager designated PMS 389.
The DD-963 (Spruance Class) Program was originally planned to
provide fifty new ASW destroyers, with additional gunfire support mission
capability. Thirty were eventually approved and a contract awarded to
Litton Systems, Inc., Pascagoula, Mississippi on 23 June 1970.
There were several new concepts applied to this program. First,
a multi-year contract was awarded to one shipbuilder for production of
all thirty ships. Second, Navy established a baseline for the ship, and
contractors specified in their proposals, the details of how the baseline
would be met.
At that time, DOD Directive 4105.62 required that research and
development contracts estimated at more than $25 million and production
contracts estimated to cost more than $100 million be subjected to
formal proposal evaluation and source selection procedures. Since this
program cost was projected to exceed $2 billion, the provisions of this
directive were applicable. The Secretary of Defense authorized the Sec-
retary of the Navy to designate the Chief of Naval Material personally
as the Source Selection Authority (SSA) . The SSA appointed a Source
Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) , consisting of eight flag officers and
two civilians. The Project Manager was designated as chairman of the
Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) , which consisted of seven
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captains, including the chairman, two commanders and six civilians.
The position of the SSA and the membership of the SSAC and SSEB reflect
the highest level of importance placed on this program's source selection
decision making process.
Visit Summary:
Since NPS had already made contact with, and received information
from, the PMS 389 staff in the past, the primary purpose of my visit
was to determine if enough documentation would be available to enable our
tracking program progress and to see if the office would support student
experience tours in the future.
It was suggested that since the DD-963 Program did not follow the
most recent DOD acquisition criteria, that following the program progress
of another type ship, such as the PF, may be more beneficial. I concurred
with this conclusion, in that an enormous amount of effort would be
required to select and reproduce material from file which would be nec-
essary to establish a proper documentation base to track program progress
from past events, through the present and into the future.
PMS 389 is already participating with NPS in student projects. Two
Operations Analysis Curriculum students are working on a study to deter-
mine repair and stocking alternatives for the gas turbine engines. The
results of this study may also apply to the PF Program and others using
the same type of gas turbines.
The DD-963 Project Office has proposed adoption of a new concept
in the assignment of military personnel to commission the ships. This
would utilize Fleet Introduction Teams (FIT) , rather than the
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conventional pre-coramissioning details (nucleus crews) for each ship. A
permanently assigned team of officers and enlisted personnel would
perform most of the functions normally accomplished hy the nucleus crew,
and act as supervisors and instructors for the ships' commissioning
crews prior, and subsequent to ship delivery.
This concept has been tried on a pilot basis with other ship types
and is expected to save large amounts of personnel travel and support
funds. The documentation provided by PMS 389 can be used for reference
purposes, or further developed into a cost effectiveness or personnel
staffing study.
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NUCLEAR - POWERED AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVAN) SHIP ACQUISITION PROJECT
Background Information:
The Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier (CVAN) Ship Acquisition Project
(PMS 392) was established 24 April 1968 to provide intensive management
for CVAN ship acquisitions.
Within the attach carrier force level authorized by the Department of
the Navy Five-Year Defense Program, the CVANs designated as the NIMITZ
Class (CVAN 68 and 69) will replace the last of the HANCOCK Class, in
the attack carrier inventory. A new Class of CVAN, now under concept
formulation, is scheduled for future construction.
The project staff consists of five military officers and approximately
twenty five civilian personnel. There is a military Project Manager
(CAPT/1400), civilian Deputy Project Manager (GS 16), who is also desig-
nated Technical Director, and two Assistant Project Managers (CVAN 68/69;
CVAN 71 CF/CD) . The Project Manager has four assistants, namely Adminis-
trative Assistant, Assistant for Technical Management, Assistant for
Programs and Logistics Manager, and Assistant for Air Systems. The
remainder of the organization includes Programs (Plans and Financial)
,
Ships Systems Management Division, Quality Assurance, Test and Trials
Management Division, and the ILS Management Division.
Visit Summary:
During my visit to Newport News, Virginia, I met with and toured the
NIMITZ construction site with the CVAN Project Officer. A summary of the
meeting is covered in the section of this report entitled Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News.
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After returning to Washington, I discussed my observations at New-
port News with the CVAN Project Manager and his deputy. They stressed
the importance of the role of the Project Officer at the construction
site. Through this source, the project office can be informed of
construction progress and advised of problems as they develop and are
resolved. This relationship is vital in keeping the project staff in
contact with events as they occur.
Both agreed with the need for using current case material in the NPS
SAM Curriculum. However, one difficulty cited in gathering this material
concerns that of presenting enough background information to set the
stage for evaluating decisions made in the past. Many decisions or final
outcomes of decisions are still pending in the form of negotiated change
orders, contract modifications, claims, etc., which points out the high
degree of importance placed by this project in the areas of procurement
and contract administration.
The quantitative approach to decision making is considered an impor-
tant aspect in the management of this project. Technique simplicity was
emphasized, to assure that the results can be understood by both those
conducting analyses, as well as those to whom the results are being
addressed. One of the techniques mentioned was the Kepner-Tregoe approach.
NAVSHIPS teaches this technique during a one-week course, as part of
their management training program.
Cost control management is an area of concern to the project. With
a single ship acquisition costing close to $1 billion, continued interest
at the highest Navy, DOD and Congressional levels creates a high
visibility environment for the Project Manager and his staff. Under
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this type of atmosphere, cost information must continuously flow be-
tween the project office, construction site and supporting activities.
One specific problem that I was able to observe for myself while
visiting Newport News, was the effect of changes to compartments or
equipment configurations once the compartments involved have already
been completed. Many of the spaces adjacent to the ship's bottom on
NIMITZ have already been completed, even though the ship is still
approximately two years away from delivery. Any changes required in
these areas of the ship, in addition to costing considerably more, may
well impact on the ship's building schedule. This again points out the
necessity for the project staff to perpetuate an uninterrupted flow of
information to and from the building site and having the on-site
Project Officer as the focal point for this information.
Contact with the CVAN project will continue. Information concerning
the contract has already been provided to NPS, which will be used in the
SAM courses. The student experience tour concept is fully supported by
PMS 392.
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PATROL FRIGATE SHIP ACQUISITION PROJECT
Background Information:
In September 1970, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) initiated a
series of feasibility studies to examine a new class or classes of
ships to conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW) , antiaircraft warfare (AAW)
and surface warfare. Equipments for these ships were to be relatively
simple, the use of complex weapon and sensor systems was to be avoided,
and rapid delivery of the ships to the fleet was essential.
After receiving the results of these studies in January 1971, CNO
approved initiation of the Conceptual Phase to explore the Patrol
Frigate (PF) mission and design assumptions in greater detail. The first
part of this phase, which consisted of design studies conducted by the
Naval Ship Engineering Center (NAVSEC) , was completed in May 1971 and
the second part, the design engineering for the ship system commenced
in June
.
Information for prospective offerers for the PF Ship System Design
(SSD) Support and lead ship construction was forwarded to industry in
October 1971, then on 8 November, an industry briefing was held by the
Ship Acquisition Project Manager (SHAPM) , NAVSHIPS PMS 399.
_A At this
Presolicitation Conference, prospective offerers were briefed on program
background, project organization and features of the current procurement.
/I PMS 399 was chartered by NAVSHIPS on 1 August 1971
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Preliminary design is scheduled for completion in December 1971 and
the first technical baseline, the PF Functional Baseline (FBL) will be
established.
The procurement plan specifies award of cost-plus-fixed-fee SSD
support contracts to two shipbuilders by mid-March 1972 and a lead-ship
production contract to one of them in April 1973. It is anticipated
that contracts for follow ships will be awarded for the first block of
24 ships in February 1975 and a second block of 25 ships in June 1977,
on a fixed price multi-year basis.
Visit Summary:
The PF is the Navy's newest large multi-year shipbuilding program.
It will evolve from the present Conceptual Phase through production
and introduction to the fleet under the latest Department of Defense
acquisition criteria.
This offers many opportunities for NPS SAM students to participate
as the program progresses. For example, during my visit I had the oppor-
tunity to attend the Presolicitation Conference. The industry represen-
tatives were given an overview of the entire program as it is now
planned, and several concepts were introduced for the first time. The
ship is being designed to meet a predetermined price ceiling, and two
shipbuilders will be working with NAVSEC in finalizing detailed plans.
Contractor A, who will be the one chosen to build the lead ship, will
not automatically assume production of the first block of follow ships,
but rather compete with other shipbuilders for the contract. Contractor
B, who will be selected to assist in engineering development, along
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with Contractor A, will not participate in the construction of the
lead ship.
Aside from discussions with the project staff and attending the
Presolicitation Conference itself, I was able to obtain copies of
the information distributed to industry prior to the conference,
and the Conference Summary distributed after the conference. This
material, coupled with copies of the Patrol Escort Concept Exploration
Report (July 71) and the Conceptual Phase Plans For Patrol Escort
(Feb and Mar 71) will serve as an information baseline for NPS in follow-
ing the progress of this program. Cases, individual reports and theses
can be developed from this material, supplemented by further contact
with the project staff.
It was determined during my visit that the PF SHAPM may have individ-
ual studies or analyses that NPS students can undertake for term pro-
jects. The concept of the assignment of SAM students to project offices
for experience tours was supported.
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COST ESTIMATING AND ANALYSIS IN NAVSHIPS
Background Information;
The Ship Cost Estimating Branch, SHIPS 0161, is responsible for
performing ship acquisition cost estimating during the planning, program-
ming, budgeting and appraisal process for all ship construction and
conversion programs, and for performing ship "life cycle" cost estimating.
This includes the responsibility for preparing, or reviewing prior
to release, all ship construction and conversion cost estimates going to
activities outside NAVSHIPS, preparing cost estimates for budgeting,
developing procedures for cost estimating which use both computer and
parametric techniques, and a host of other functions pertaining to cost
estimating.
There are approximately twenty six civilian personnel in the branch.
No military personnel are assigned.
Visit Summary:
At the recommendation of the PMS 392 staff, I visited SHIPS 0161.
Since the individual projects are not staffed with sufficient cost
analysis expertise, this organization is involved with all of the pro-
ject offices in NAVSHIPS. Because of the management attention and high
visibility directed to cost control, it is indeed a vital link in the
project management structure.
The two primary functions performed by this office are cost estimating
and cost analysis. Cost estimating concerns the in-house development of
cost estimates and cost analysis involves the review and validation
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of cost estimates prepared by outside activities. Approximately one
half of the staff is dedicated to each of these functions. Independent
cost estimates are provided to the NAVSHIPS 02 contracts organization
prior to bid openings.
No "should cost" studies for ship acquisitions have been conducted
to date, however almost half of the project staff have already received
"should cost" training at an Army sponsored course of instruction.
The Branch Head was interested in the SAM Curriculum and agreed to
assist us in any way possible. Although no military are currently
assigned to SHIPS 0161, he emphasized the importance of officers assigned
to projects becoming aware of the services provided by the branch.
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SUPERVISOR OF SHIPBUILDING, CONVERSION AND REPAIR, USN, NEWPORT NEWS
Background Information:
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIP) USN,
Newport News is located at the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock
Company, a division of Tenneco Incorporated, Newport News, Virginia.
The responsibilities of this organization include the administration
of Navy and other Department of Defense contracts for ship design,
construction, conversion, outfitting, repair, alteration, inactivation
and reactivation, planning, estimating and design functions for Navy
ship work in the contractor's plant, review and approval of contractor's
plans, providing technical and engineering assistance, administering
Quality Assurance programs, and arranging and overseeing performance
during trials.
The SUPSHIP organization is commanded by the Supervisor (RADM/1400)
and consists of approximately thirty military and four hundred civilian
personnel. It is structured on a matrix basis with Project Offices
established for the various ship programs, and Assistants to the
Supervisor for Weapons and Aviation Systems, Management Information
Systems Officer and Product Assurance Engineering Office reporting
directly to the Supervisor. The department structure of the organiza-
tion includes Administrative, Planning, Quality Assurance, Contract,
and Material Departments.
Visit Summary:
The primary purpose of my visit to Newport News was to attend the
DLGN 36 Class Quarterly Production Progress Conference and to observe
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SUPSHIP operations. Comments concerning the conference are included
in the section of this report dealing with the AAW Ship Acquisition
Project.
After discussions with the Contracting Officer and attending the
conference, I toured the DLGN and CVAN construction sites and met
with both the DLGN and CVAN Project Officers and their staffs.
The Contracting Officer was already familiar with the NPS SAM
Program, and stressed the importance of officers being familiar with
field contract administration procedures, in addition to the other phases
of procurement. He also emphasized the necessity of developing an
understanding and appreciation of the contractor viewpoint in approaching
solutions to contract related problems.
We discussed the need for "business competence" and "better business
practices" which is now being emphasized at the highest levels of
Congress, DOD and Navy. One of the proposed methods of upgrading our
business posture is establishing Business Managers in the Project Offices
and SUPSHIP organizations. There are several ways that a Business
Manager can be established in a SUPSHIP and specific areas in which a
business staff can apply their efforts. One approach is discussed
below:
First, we should compare the present SUPSHIP organizational


































* This format is not intended to represent the entire SUPSHIP organizational
structure, but rather to present the relative organizational position of a
Business Manager and his staff. This is only an alternative and is not
intended to represent an officially recognized structure.
The primary purpose of a Business Review Staff would be that of pro-
viding a systems review of contractor activities, i.e. estimating, budgeting,
financial control, cost accounting, material control and quality assurance
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systems; and efficient utilization of resources, including manpower
planning and allocation, facilities utilization, etc. Visibility would
be given to many areas that now seem to be resolved only through claims,
such as implementing a Profitability System to clearly identify the pro-
fit picture for each contract, and a Q/A System that would not rely
solely on government inspection.
This approach to management could be highly controversial, in terms
of contractor attitudes and funding to support the installation of
these new management systems. If a contractor recognizes his inabilities
to cope with costing, scheduling and control problems, etc., then work-
ing with him would be considerably easier than the situation where he
feels his own systems are adequate and government requirements will only
serve to disrupt his own operations.
The success of establishing the concept as a way of doing business
with a contractor has yet to be proven. This subject should present
meaningful opportunities for further exploration by a student (s) in the
SAM Curriculum.
During my discussions with the Project Officers and their staffs, I
asked which areas that were problems for them could be addressed in the
SAM Curriculum. Their greatest concern was the interpretation of contract
specifications and the resolve of problems associated with the interpre-
tations. Two short problems were cited as example situations:
(1) Welding Specifications: The contractor was directed to use
either ASME or ABS standards in performing a welding task.
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Certification for this work was to be accomplished in accordance
with the applicable MILSTD. The matrix below shows the dilemma
that resulted, simply because the MILSTD did not specify the same
procedures as either the ASME or ABS standard procedures.
Procedure MILSTD Rqmts. ASME Stds. ABS Stds
A X X
B X X




(2) Paint Specifications: The CVAN contract specifications called
for application of a preservative metallic base coat, then painting
to a prescribed thickness. The specifications called for the base
coat to be applied in greater thickness than called for in the
NAVSHIPS Technical Manual. When paint was applied to the surface
over the base coat, it peeled within twenty-four hours. This was
an example of the specifications not being current with the "state
of the art" information contained in technical references. Had the
specification not been so specific, the contractor would have done
the job right In the first place.
A classroom exercise for studying this area could be developed by
having students read a given set of specifications. The class could be
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split into two groups, one interpreting the specs from a contractor
viewpoint, and the other from the government viewpoint. Each group would
develop their own interpretations separately, then meet with the other
group, compare notes and resolve differences.
Training for both officer and civilian SUPSHIP personnel was a
specific interest area expressed by one of the Project Officers. He
felt that the three week Management Course for Engineering Duty Officers
conducted at Norfolk by Harbridge House and the series of courses
sponsored by the Naval Material Command Headquarters as part of their
Contract Administration Improvement Project were very beneficial.
When asked their opinion as to the feasibility of having some of
the SAM students having experience tours in a SUPSHIP organization, the
Project Officers agreed that this would be an excellent educational ex-
perience. Both indicated that the students should have a basic knowledge
of contracts and the provisions of the NAVSHIPS acquisition directives
in advance of such tours, in order to relate their experiences during
the tour to the proper way of doing business. This would also improve
their ability to contribute to the organization they are assigned to.
After discussions with these people and actually observing some of the
same problem areas discussed while touring the DLGNs and CVANs, I am in
complete agreement.
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SURFACE KISSILE SYSTEMS (SMS) PROJECT
Background Information:
The Surface Missile Systems (SMS) Project (PMO 403) is chartered by
the Naval Ordnance Systems Command (NAVORD) . Prior to December 1969,
the development of surface missile systems was the responsibility of
the SMS Project Office (PM 3). On 18 December 1969, the project was
redesignated as PMO 403 and on 1 July 1971 the latest charter was
issued.
PMO 403 is responsible for the management of two major programs,
namely the SMS Weapon Systems Program and the Ship Anti-Missile
Integrated Defense (SAMID) Program. The Project Manager has been deli-
gated special authority by the Chief of Naval Material to integrate,
direct and/or coordinate the efforts of various Project Managers and
Systems Commands for all SMS programs throughout the Naval Material
Command and for the establishment of an integrated anti-ship missile de-
fense system.
The SMS Program consists of TERRIER, TARTAR, and TALOS (3T) Weapon
Systems, including their surveilance, weapon direction, fire control,
and launching sub-systems, and the missiles. A STANDARD Missile
Extended Range (ER) Weapon System has been developed to succeed the
TERRIER HT Missile and the STANDARD Missile Medium Range (MR) to replace
the Improved TARTAR Missile. The MK-26 Combined Guided Missile Launcher
is designed to stow and launch a combined load of STANDARD MR, AEGIS and
ASROC Missiles.
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Other systems in the SMS family include Point Defense and the
Advanced Surface Missile Weapon System (AEGIS). Point Defense includes
three versions (Basis Point Defense, Improved Point Defense and Advance
Point Defense)
. United States participation in the NATO SEASPARROW
Project is integral with Improved Point Defense. AEGIS is being de-
veloped for installation on new ships in future years. The sub-system
descriptions for these systems are similar to the 3 T sub-systems
described above.
The SAMID Program is a special assignment for PMO 403 by CNM, and
the management process is treated separately from the SMS Program.
Sub-systems, such as SMS, radar, command and control, EW, etc., are
integrated and coordinated through the SAMID Program. PMO 403 tasks
the REWSON Systems Project (PM 7) directly for all SAMID ECM sub-system
requirements that come under the purview of the PM 7 Project.
This complex combination of missile systems is managed by six Pro-
gram Managers, who report to the SMS Project Manager. Each manager has
his own program staff, which is tailored organizationally to fit the
specific needs of the particular program. Program Managers are desig-
nated for the TERRIER, TARTAR, TALOS , AEGIS, Point Defense and SAMID
Programs.
Visit Summary:
The SMS Project organization is unique, in that it has undergone
two major changes since December 1969. The first was transition from a
CNM designated project (PM 3) to a NAVORD project (PMO 403). At
this time, the PM 3 staff in its entirety became the PMO 403 staff.
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In may 1971, as part of the NAVQRD reorganization, PMO 403 was
reduced in size from three hundred seven military and civilian
personnel to about eighty, which is the present personnel level. This
resulted in a shift of support personnel from within the project to
the NAVORD functional organization. A summary of the "before" and
"after" reorganization staff tally is shown below:
Component
PMO 403 Staff





















NOTE: The above figures include both military and civilian
staff. There are approximately nineteen officers
assigned to the project at present. The Project Mana-
ger, Deputy Project Manager, Director of Plans,
Programs and Resources, and five of the six Program
Managers are Navy Captains.
This series of changes demonstrates an important aspect of project
management. That is, as a project progresses through its life cycle,
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the organizational and personnel requirements will change. Its whole
orientation changes as it evolves from the Research and Development stage,
through production and on to modernization. This change becomes more
pronounced in a conglomerate project, where many systems in different
stages of development are managed by the same project organization.
As these changes occur, the project staff must adapt to a new
environment. For example, the Plans, Programs and Resources, and ILS
staffs were reduced greatly and the technical codes eliminated entirely.
The people were transferred to other NAVORD codes, who are now tasked
with providing support to the SMS Programs. However, their services
are now extended to other areas of effort other than SMS. This situa-
tion calls for a different management approach to assure that the work
is done, where people are no longer under the direct control of the
Project Manager.
The particular problem of diminishing personnel resources being
distributed over a greater range of work effort is not peculiar to the
SMS Project. It can be a problem in any project organization, and is
cited here as an example.
I held discussions with the Deputy SMS Project Manager; Director
of Plans, Programs and Resources; TERRIER Program Manager; TARTAR,
Point Defense and AEGIS Deputy Program Managers, and senior staff
members from these organizations. Of the programs being managed, AEGIS
with its largest individual complement of personnel, is probably the
most self sufficient organization.
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AEGIS, which is now in the development phase, has a sophisticated
management information system, which monitors program status from both
the contractor and Navy viewpoints. The work breakdown structure (WBS)
is covered by MILSTANDARD 881. The control system extends to work
origin/organization, scheduling, cost, contractor performance, and
technical performance measurement. Earned values, equating to pro-
grammed or budgeted costs can be compared with actual costs, which are
charged by cost account.
Another aspect of sophistication in the management of this program
deals with threat analysis and modeling. The AEGIS staff is a direct
contributor, and maintains and updates the Threat Model Handbook. This
is one area of endeavor that I did not find the other projects that I
visited involved with directly. Enabling the project staff to track
right along with the operational requirements for the systems, as
changes occur, can give the Project Manager, in my opinion, a more
positive control over the direction of his program.
TERRIER, being an operational system, has the smallest program
staff and an entirely different management orientation. In this organ-
ization the primary emphasis is in the area of improving the existing
systems over a long period of time. These systems are installed in
almost forty active fleet combatant ships.
TARTAR, as part of the Interim Surface to Surface Missile (ISSM)
program, encompasses numerous missile and launcher systems. Currently,
forty-six combatant ships have missile systems under the cognizance
of this program, with a potential add-on of fifty ships in the future.
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After my visit, the STANDARD Missile 2 development responsibility was
shifted from TARTAR to the AEGIS Program.
Both the TERRIER and TARTAR program staffs have a wide range of
responsibilities with a minimal number of personnel. Referring back to
the previous paragraphs concerning the reorganization, those people
remaining with these program staffs now have a greater coordination
and monitoring burden. This is representative of the trade-off
decisions that have to be made by Project Managers and their seniors,
in deciding how to best manage and staff the wide variety of different
programs.
Point Defense systems now exist in three different verions: Basic
Point Defense in the production phase; Improved Point Defense, as the
U.S. portion of NATO SEASPARROW Program, is still in the development
phase; and Advanced Point Defense will replace the SPARROW Missile
at some future date. Point Defense systems are part of the ongoing
Anti-Ship Missile Defense (ASMD) Program. NATO SEASPARROW is discussed
in another section of this report.
The SMS Project and Program Managers cooperated to the fullest extent
during my visit, both in making time available for discussion, and by
providing documentation. They support the NPS programs and the exper-
ience tour concept. A NPS engineering student, for example, was engaged
in thesis research at an RCA facility, in connection with the AEGIS
program, at the time of my visit. It was regretted that sufficient time




The NATO SEASPARROW Project Office (NSPO) is chartered under a
Memorandum of Understanding which pledges the participating governments
(United States, Norway, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, and Belgium) to
the cooperative effort of developing and producing the surface ship
self-defense system named NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile System
(NSSMS)
.
A NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee (NSPSC) , composed of one
member from each of the participating governments, is responsible for the
implementation of this cooperative effort, in accordance with the terms
of the Memorandum of Understanding. The NSPSC members are responsible
for the coordination required within their own respective countries.
The NSPO serves as the executive staff for the NSPSC, and is
responsible for the development and acquisition of the weapons systems.
Each participating government furnishes staff personnel for manning
the project office. A Project Manager, designated by the United States
as head of the NSPO, is responsible to the steering committee for the
operation of the office.
Each member nation assumes part of the development and production
responsibility for the weapons systems. A single U.S. prime development
contractor was selected, and sub-contracts awarded to companies in
the participating countries, on a predetermined percentage of share
basis. A country's share is dependent upon it's contribution to
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the total development costs and the number of units of the total system
required.
Visit Summary:
NATO SEASPARROW is quite unique in comparison with out other Navy
projects. The Project Manager and his staff manage the same scope of
activities, and face for resolve the same problems as the normal project
organizations. However, instead of being responsible through the normal
Navy chain-of-command, they report to the NATO SEASPARROW Project
Steering Committee. This arrangement requires a management team effort
within the project organization itself, and an extraordinary coordination
and liaison relationship with each member country's naval defense organi-
zations. NSPO works closely with the NAVOKD SMS Project Office, since
the NSSMS is one of the family of surface missile defense systems.
NSPO is now in the process of developing recommendations concerning
the feasibility of a multi-national support agreement to provide
continuing logistic support for the systems after they have been pro-
duced and delivered to the respective countries. This study may result
in the preparation of a proposal which would be acceptable to the parti-
cipating countries, or establish that multi-national support would not
be of mutual benefit.
The participating countries have been discussing the need for
establishing a means of providing continuing support, including training,
configuration management, repair and maintenance facilities, etc. This is
the first time, however, that a multi-national logistic support concept
will be considered. The objective is to develop, if possible, a means
of accomodating these support requirements within the framework of
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existing organizations, and not establishing a new organization to manage
and operate the support program.
Naval Postgraduate School has been invited to participate in this
study, by developing an independent evaluation of the feasibility of
the multi-national support concept. Interested students will have the
opportunity to become involved in a "real world" oprational problem,
and possibly contribute to developing a new approach to project manage-
ment. NPS has expressed an interest in this project, and liaison with
the NATO SEASPAKROW Project Office will continue, for this and other
possible future student projects.
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PHALANX / VULCAN CLOSE - IN WEAPON SYSTEM PROGRAM
Background Information;
The PHALANX/VULCAN Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) is managed by the
CIWS Program Office (NAVORD 5515) , which is part of the Systems
Acquisition Directorate, Surface Weapon Systems Acquisition Sub-Group
of the Naval Ordnance Systems Command. This office is an element of
the functional organization, as compared with the NAVORD weapons systems
project offices designated PMOs. A Program (vice Project) Manager heads
the CIWS Program Office, and his assignment, as in the case of a PMO, is
approved by the Commander, Naval Ordnance Systems Command.
Program History:
In early 1966, the Chief of Naval Operations requested the Bureau of
Naval Weapons (now NAVORD) evaluate industry proposals for a new light-
weight shipboard gun system, capable of destroying high-speed incoming
targets. By November 1968, General Dynamics Pomona Division had formally
proposed PHALANX as a close-in weapon system.
A Program Engineer was assigned to coordinate the CIWS program in
March 1969, and the Proposed Technical Approach (PTA) was forwarded
to the Chief of Naval Operations in April. The Advanced Development
Contract was awarded to General Dynamics in August 1969, and a series
of feasibility tests were commenced in February 1970.
The technical Development Plan (TDP) was submitted on 15 February
1970, and the Advanced Procurement Plan (APP) for CIWS was forwarded
to the Naval Material Command on 30 September 1970.
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A Program Manager for CIWS was assigned in May 1971, and designated
ORD 5515. That same month the Engineering Development Contract was
awarded to General Dynamics. On 2 July 1971, the Development Concept
Paper (DCP) was distributed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant
Secretaries of Defense and Assistant Secretaries of the Navy for con-
currence. A CIWS management review was held by the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering on 27 July.
The draft Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) was distributed
for review and comment on 5 August 1971. In early October, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (R & D) was briefed on the reliability and maintain-
ability aspects of the CIWS by the Program Manager.
Visit Summary:
During my project office visits, I spent the most time with the
PHALANX/VULCAN Program. My interest in this program resulted from the
following factors: (1) in comparison with most of the other projects,
it was new, with the Program Manager having been assigned only six months
before; (2) the program organization was compact, consisting of a PM
(CDR/1100) , Deputy Program Manager, one Program Engineer and one secretary;
(3) the CIWS itself is designed to have universal shipboard application,
therefore there would be a resulting interaction with most, if not all,
NAVSHIPS Project Managers at some point in time; (4) and during the course
of my Washington tour, several key milestone events would occur, which
would affect the future of the program.
I was granted permission by the Program Manager to attend all
meetings and briefings concerning CIWS, talk at any time to his staff
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and other NAVORD components concerning any management aspect of the
program, and review any documentation from the Program Office files
which would be of potential value in meeting the needs of my trip or
the SAM Curriculum. In short, I had complete access to all aspects of
the program operation.
This program, consequently, was the high point of my Washington
visit, in that I had the opportunity to experience the project environ-
ment in as close to a real working capacity as could be possible. I
was also able to obtain a considerable amount of thesis material and
other documentation for use by the SAM Curriculum. In turn, I prepared
a Program Chronology for use by the Program Manager.
The following paragraphs will cover the key events that occurred
during the course of my visit. Since I was simultaneously visiting other
projects during this same period of time, I was not personally involved
in all of the events.
On 12 October a budget hearing was conducted by DDR&E in the Pentagon,
This was one of a series of budget sessions that involved most, if not
all Project Managers, and the issue was justification of the Fiscal Year
1973 budget requirements. The hearing were hastily scheduled, and with
little advance notification the Deputy Program Manager and OPNAV CIWS
Program Sponsor prepared a presentation. Since a minimal amount of time
was available for the presentation, the Program Sponsor gave a short
management overview of program progress to date, then invited questions
from the floor. A barrage of questions were forthcoming, and almost all
were of a technical nature concerning capability and performance. The
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Deputy PM answered these questions as they were raised, consequently the
hearing was of short duration. I was surprised by two factors: (1) the
attendees of the hearing were not introduced, therefore it was impossible
to identify in all cases who was asking the questions, and (2) considering
that this was a budget hearing, only a minimal number of questions con-
cerning the budget submission were posed.
The Program Manager briefed representatives from the government of
Israel and representatives from the Naval Ship Engineering Center
(NAVSEC) concerning the CIWS Program, in two separate sessions on 15 Oc-
tober. These were but two in a series of briefings that are required
to promulgate information to those who will be potential users of the
system in the future, and those who will be involved with installing
the units aboard ship.
A major milestone event was the CNO Executive Board (CEB) briefing
held on 19 October. During this meeting the CNO and his leading ad-
visors were briefed by the Program Manager as to the current status and
production options available for the CIWS Program. From this meeting
the decision to proceed with engineering development and continue
specific planning for production of operational and proto-type units
was made, and a projected Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date
assigned. This was indeed a major event, since theoretically the decision
could have just as easily been made to discontinue the program. Other
programs have been stopped or deferred by the CEB in the past. The CNO
personally chairs this meeting, and this in itself can account for a
great deal of expectation by a Project Manager. COMNAVORD was the only
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other representative from the NAVORD organization attending the meeting.
The Deputy Program Manager and I were able to hear, but not see, what
was happening from the projection room. Final results of this meeting
were promulgated by letter on 22 October.
In early November, the Program Manager designated the CIWS Integrated
Logistics Support (ILS) Management Team. Eight people from various
functional codes were assigned the responsibility for completing the CIWS
ILS planning and implementation. Since the Program Office does not
have an ILS staff, an ILS Manager is assigned from OKD 04, and he and
the other team members are designated in writing, to be responsible to
the Program Manager for management of the ILS function.
Initial discussions with representatives of the Naval Ship Systems
Command to discuss the initial planning aspects for installing the CIWS
units aboard active fleet ships, were held on 4 November. Since funds
could not be cited at that time, and the ships on which CIWS units
were to be installed had not been assigned, NAVSHIPS was unable to
commence formal planning efforts. The real accomplishment of this
meeting was making those people who would be involved aware of the
program requirements. Later that week, a meeting was held with the
CVAN Project staff to discuss planning for CIWS aboard the new construc-
tion attack aircraft carriers.
On 9 November 1971, a management briefing, similar to the one
presented to the CEB, was held for the Secretary of the Navy. This also
was a significant milestone, for it could have resulted in a change in
program direction.
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An OPN budget review hearing was held by the OPNAV financial staff
for the Anti Surface Missile Defense (ASMD) program, which includes the
PHALANX/VULCAN system. During this meeting it was apparant that the
recent CEB results influenced the budget trade-off decisions, in
that funds were reduced from some of the individual programs to assure
more funding availability for the highest priority programs.
Further events and observations concerning the PHALANX/VULCAN
Program will be included in my forthcoming thesis concerning weapons
system acquisition management. Liaison with the program office will
continue.
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S-3A PROJECT (PMA 244) AND E-2/C-2ATDS PROJECT (PMA 231)
My visit to both of these Naval Air Systems Comand Projects resulted
from previous contact by the Naval Postgraduate School. Both Project
Managers had scheduled visits to the school, to brief SAM students con-
cerning their own experiences in project management.
Captain Fred H. Baughman, the S-3A Project Manager, developed two
case studies concerning the Contract Definition phase of the S-3A. I had
the opportunity to assist in the preparation for his visit, by developing
a set of representative student questions that might be asked during his
presentation and by reviewing the cases and making comment. Copies of
the questions, Captain Baughman 's replies and the cases were then forwarded
to NPS prior to his visit.
Captain Thomas D. Quinn, the E-2/C-2/ATDS Project Manager, had de-
veloped a case concerning the EA-6B Project. He had previously served in
the EA-6B Program as OPNAV Coordinator of Program Requirements for Airborne
Electronic Warfare. This experience coupled with that of now being a PMA
enables Captain Quinn to present the subject of project management from
both the OPNAV and acquisition management viewpoints. My assist in this
instance was limited to providing an advance student reaction to the case,
prior to his presentation at the school. Copies were also provided prior
to that presentation.
Both fully support the NPS SAM Curriculum and stress the need for
a mixture of theory and reality in the academic program.
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SYSTEMS COMMAND CONTRACTS DIRECTORATES
Background Information:
Each Systems Command has a Contracts Directorate (02) , which is
responsible for the planning, award and termination of contracts. Addi-
tional responsibilities include providing advice and assistance in con-
tracting matters, developing and promulgating Command policies and moni-
toring contractual performance.
Contracting in NAVSHIPS is performed by three divisions: Shipbuilding
and Repair Purchase, Electronics Purchase, and Machinery Purchase. NAVAIR
also has three divisions: Airframe Purchase, Aircraft Components Purchase,
and Weapons System Purchase. NAVORD contracting is distributed among
four divisions: USW Systems Purchase, AAW Systems Purchase, Strategic
Warfare Systems Purchase, and Surface Warfare Systems, Talos and Missile
Development Purchase. These are the divisions that have an everyday
working relationship with the various project organizations. The Con-
tracts Directorates additonally have support divisions and staffs to
perform the other aspects of their organizational missions.
Visit Summary:
I visited three Contracts Directorates: NAVAIR 02, NAVORD 02,
and NAVSHIPS 02. Each confirmed the necessity of developing a more com-
plete understanding, between the contracts and project personnel, of the
importance of team effort in supporting the acquisition of large complex
systems. Project personnel must understand the importance of following
proper contracting practices and procedures, and on the other hand, con-
tracts personnel must be responsive to the needs of the projects.
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Cost analysis is viewed as a critical area. One prime example in-
volves claims. Contractors have professional legal staffs to develop
claims; then the government has the responsibility to review the data
and develop counter proposals or deny the claims. Managers must have
the ability to make the "crunch" decisions as to the validity and
reasonableness of the claims. This ability is contingent upon cost
analysis expertise.
Another point discussed is the time required for industry to de-
velop proper proposals. In many instances, where there are delays in
issuing the Requests for Proposal (RFPs) , contractors are expected to
bring the whole program back on schedule by taking less time to develop
their proposals. To compensate, the contractors may submit "shotgun"
estimates, which will always be higher in price. Another possible
result is a less than acceptable proposal from the technical viewpoint.
This relates to the previous paragraph dealing with the necessity of all
concerned to know the rules and practices and then working together in
a team effort to achieve the required results.
The contracting officials supported the need for the SAM Curriculum
to work with current case material, as a means of involving students
in finding solutions to present day problems, and agreed to assist in
any way they could. They also concurred that experience tours would
provide an additional element of realism to the curriculum, and greatly
benefit the officers involved.
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OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
Aside from those that have already been summarized, I visited other
component organizations within OPNAV, NAVMAT, NAVSHIPS, NAVORD and the
Bureau of Personnel.
The primary purpose of these visits was to update interested parties
as to the status of the SAM Curriculum and solicit information that
could be used in the SAM courses. Documentation such as organizational
manuals, reports, instructions, etc. were provided, as well as materials
that can be developed into case problems.
Contact with these organizations resulted from recommendations by
either project office personnel or presentations at the NLMS Baseline
Course. The areas discussed included latest policies under develop-
ment, latest procedures being implemented, NAVMAT reorganization study,
Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) concepts, PPBS cycle, etc.
An important observation that should be noted is that the problems
of project (acquisition) management are being acted upon by all levels
of the OPNAV and NAVMAT headquarters organizations. Guidance is avail-
able to help the projects arrive at conclusions/solutions to their
problems, and in many cases this seems to be unrecognized.
All that I talked with reiterated the need for a continuing
educational process, starting from an academic base and followed through
by periodic updating while on the job. An important aspect of the "on
the job" process is that of developing a closer working dialogue
between the OPNAV (user) and NAVMAT (producer) communities.
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During the week of 15 November, I assisted my faculty advisor during
his visits to the Washington headquarters and project organizations.
Again, our findings were of complete cooperation in supporting the SAM
Curriculum at Naval Postgraduate School.
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SUMMARY
After attending the NLMS Baseline Course, my original plan was to
establish an orderly schedule for calling on the various project and
functional organizations. This approach was found unworkable, in that
my attendance at top level meetings, i.e. the CNO CEB presentation
and NAVMAT Management Review, which were attended with the PHALANX/
VULCAN Program Manager, and NAVSHIPS PF Industry Briefing, and special
meetings involving the Project/Program Managers, were scattered through-
out the duration of my tour. Additionally, it was necessary to coordi-
nate my visits to fit the schedules of individual Project Managers and
their staffs. Consequently, in formating this report, I chose to
refrain from relating to my actual schedule, and summarized by organi-
zation. Hopefully, this will assist in maintaining a degree of conti-
nuity in reporting the results of my visit.
In summarizing the individual organizations, I concentrated on develop-
ing areas that were of specific concern to individual staffs, and those
areas, defined by personal observation, that would provide examples of
problems applicable to other projects as well.
The most significant common denominator among the projects, is the
incredible amount of change that must be faced, i.e. changes in require-
ments, priorities, scheduling, configuration, funding, timing, personnel,
etc. Reaction to these changes and developing solutions to problems
depend upon a number of factors, including: how project offices are
organized and staffed, the urgency of the project as viewed by the
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Systems Command level and above, and a variety of behavioral considera-
tions. Each project organization is dedicated to a different task(s),
with different requirements, and the result is that each Project
Manager and staff has developed a particular management style to fit his
specific needs.
Without exception, the NPS SAM Curriculum has universal support by
those that I met in Washington. Every person that I talked with
cooperated to the fullest extent, both in discussing project office
operations, problems being encountered in the field of project manage-
ment and by providing information and suggestions that will be of
assistance in the curriculum. Considering coverage of approximately
thirty different organizational components and contact with over one
hundred people, I found this to be of great significance.
Assigning officer students to project organizations during the
course of their NPS SAM program was viewed as a positive benefit to
both the students and the organizations to which they would be assigned.
There were, however, different opinions as to the length of the ideal
experience tour. Most preferred a whole academic term, rather than a
half term. A six week (1/2 term) tour would be too short in duration to
provide a well rounded view of project operations and still enable the
officers to actually participate in a working capacity to gain
experience.
Another concept, which relates directly to the experience tour,
is that of establishing a simulated project office environment at NPS,
by assigning the students to actual project office roles and having
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them manage the acquisition of a simulated weapons system, from the
initial planning phase through the duration of the life-cycle. The
Defense Systems Management School (DSMS) , Fort Belvoir, is developing
and using this educational technique at present, which is structured
around a series of computer oriented exercises. Using this same
technique, NPS could develop a program, whereby officers once having
completed their experience tours, could return to NPS and apply the
benefits of their recent experiences to the solution of problems in
the simulated acquisition project.
One of the Project Managers interviewed, suggested that assigning
officers to a given project and the supporting SUPSHIP or NAVPRO, would
provide a project team that could relate to that single program from
different points of view. He felt that trying to form project teams
with officers that had their experience tours in a highly diversified
group of project offices, may present significant difficulties.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It can be concluded from my visit that the NPS SAM Curriculum is
vitally needed, as a means of assuring that Navy is making progress
in finding better ways to face the increasingly complex problems of
managing the acquisition of large sophisticated weapons systems.
The establishment of experience tours as part of the curriculum,
even at the expense of extending the program to seven or eight terms is
felt to have a high payoff. By this means the students will receive
that necessary exposure to and experience in the project management area,
and provide a means by which the curriculum could be continuously up-dated
as policy, procedural and operational changes occur. Currency must be
assured to meet the stated objectives of the SAM Curriculum. If funding
availability becomes a constraint, students could be selected to par-
ticipate in experience tours on a competitive basis or other means of
determination designed to limit the number of students.
Another method of assuring that the curriculum is kept current with
the needs of the "real world" is by continuing the exchange of NPS faculty
and persons qualified to teach from the Washington project organizations.
Especially considering the high degree of interest in the NPS program
expressed by those contacted in Washington, every means of keeping
abreast of events as they are occurring is necessary. Student and
faculty experience tours, and presentations at NPS by project staff
personnel and Project Managers are all means of accomplishing this
objective.
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It is hoped that this report has provided an adequate overview of
project operations, problems being experienced by the projects and
supporting functional organizations, and some recommendations as
to how we can improve our Systems Acquisition Management Curriculum
at Naval Postgraduate School. Time prevented further exploration in
many of the areas, and this is regretted; however with the contacts
that have been made, with their readiness to assist, it is assured
that we have made progress.
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APPENDIX A
NAVY LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT SCHOOL
NAVAL STATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20390
WEASON SYSTEM ACQUISITON MANAGEMENT BASELINE
COURSE
TRIM //6400 XXX 7100 27 September - 8 October 1971
COMMAND /RANK/NAME TITLE CODE
OPNAV
CDR Carl. W. Addison
CDR Melvin R. Lee
LCDR James A. MaGee
CAPT John G. Now
CDR David C. Shepherd
CAPT Martin J. Twite, Jr.
LTCOL (sel) Bobby R. Wilkinson
PM-1
CAPT J. A. Fitzpatrick
CDR John A. Eshman
PM-16
CDR William G. Michael
NAVELEX
CAPT Raymond A. Pettigrew
NAVORD
CAPT Alfred M. Pride
CAPT James F. Rex
CAPT Deming W. Smith
Carrier Warfare - ASW
ASW Ordinance
Asst. Air ASW Branch
Hd., Amphibious Warfare Desk
Asst. Head CVAN Program
Coordinator
Unguided Air to Surface
Weapons
Plans & Programs Branch




























CAPT Edward W. Molzan
CAPT Robert K. Reed
CAPT David L. Soracco




Deputy Director, Deep Sub.
Sys. Project PMS-395
OTHER






Navy Logistics Management School
CAPT M. J. Franger, Mr. H. V. Pelton, Mr. E. L. Sutton, Jr.
Anti-Air Warfare Ship Acquisiton Project
CAPT J. T. Burrill (PMS 378), Mr. W. J. Fitzpatrick (PMS 378B)
,
Mr. N. E. Plotner (PMS 378A1) , LCDR J. West & Mr. J. Marks (PMS 3783)
Anti-Submarine Warfare Ship Acquisition Project
Mr. P. A. Batten (PMS 380A4)
Auxiliary and Amphibious Ship Acquisition Project
CAPT E. A. Molzan (PMS 383), LT R. E. Hoffler (PMS 383H) , Mr. C.
Becker (PMS 383A2) , Mr. D. W. Kelly (PMS 383A3) , LCDR J. M. Bell
(PMS 383G), Mr. P. L. Barksdale (PMS 383-12)
Destroyer Ship Acquisition Project
CDR T. A. Biddison (PMS 3893)
Nuclear-Powered Aircraft Carrier Ship Acquisition Project
CAPT R. J. Eustace (PMS 392), Mr. J. R. Kling (PMS 392B)
Patrol Frigate Ship Acquisition Project
CAPT E. J. Otth (PMS 399), LCDR J. Quartana
Cost Estimating and Analysis Branch, NAVSHIPS
Mr. G. H. Main (SHIPS 0161)
SUPSHIP, Newport News
.
CAPT J. D. Evans (101), CDR W. E. Lowery (153), LCDR P. Sipple (154)
Mr. S. A. Smith (154), CDR D. W. Potter (400)
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Surface Missile Systems Project
CAPT E. A. Chrlstofferson (PM0 403A) , Mr. W. G. Dressel (PMO 403D)
,
CAPT (Sel) J. R. Rapkin (PMO 403-01), CDR E. E. Goodwin (PMO 403-01C)
,
Mr. M. H. Meekins (PMO 403-01A) , CDR J. Roan (PMO 403-10), Mr. R. L.
Mallonee (PMO 403-10A) , Mr. H. C. Fronc (PMO 403-2QA) , Mr. W. J.
Dichtel (PMO 403-40A) , Mr. S. F- Huthinson (PMO 403-41), Mr. D. P.
Pulvirenti (PMO 403-50A)
NATO SEASPARROW Project
CAPT T. M. Ward (NATO-00)
Phalanx/Vulcan Close-in Weapon System Program
CDR J. E. Paulk (ORD 5515), Mr. E. H. Gerlach, Mr. B. H. Tabb
S-3A Project E-2/C-2/ATDS Project
CAPT F. H. Baughman (PMA 244) CAPT T. D. Quinn (PMA 231)
LCDR B. A. Wilcox (PMA 2443)
Systems Commands Contracts Directorates
RADM K. L. Woodfin (NSHP 02), CAPT W. M. Emery (NSHP 02C) , CAPT L. 0.
Larson (N0RD 02), CDR J. E. McGee (NAIR 215A)
Naval Material Command Headquarters
VADM G. E. Moore II (NMAT 09), CAPT R. B. Cordray (NMAT 011),
RADM R. G. Freeman III (NMAT 02), LCDR P. DeMayo (NMAT 0202),
CDR R. L. 0'Neil (NMAT 0213), CDR R. Youmans (NMAT 021D) , Mr. C.
McCarthy (NMAT 0421), Mr. W. A. Doyle (NMAT 051)
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Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Dr. 0. R. Burns (NOP 098T) , COL D. C. Stanton (NOP 982-F2)
,
LCDR R. R. Rumney (NOP 980-E43) , LCDR P. S. Frommer (NOP 980-E40)
CAPT R. E. Adams (NOP 980E)
Bureau of Naval Personnel
CAPT W. W. Coons (PERS Ae) , CAPT R. M. Weidman, Jr. (PERS Ag)
,
CAPT L. F. Hicks (PERS Ag) , LCDR R. W. Hunter (PERS Balb)
,
CDR W. F. Grimm (PERS 1308), CDR W. H. Mayer (PERS B1501)
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